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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on The Utah Court Of Appeals by §78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah 
Code (2003). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue. The trial court erred in granting a dismissal of Appellant's Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce where appellant requested that alimony be terminated for co-
habitation when his former spouse and boyfriend spent the majority of their time 
together, former spouse had her vehicle at the home of her boyfriend twenty out of every 
thirty days for at least a year, boyfriend had use of her vehicle, she paid some of 
boyfriend's utilities and satellite bill so she could watch satellite at his residence, she and 
boyfriend ate many if not most of their meals together, boyfriend cared for her at his 
house while she was sick, boyfriend had access to her house when she was not present, 
her adult children believed she lived with boyfriend and were told she would be at 
boyfriend's house whenever they could not get a hold of her, and she and boyfriend had a 
sexual relationship. 
Standard of Review. "Whether dismissal was appropriate for failure to make a prima 
facie case is a question of law reviewed for correctness." Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 
581, 584 (Utah App. 1999). The court "may weigh the evidence, consider credibility, 
and dismiss if it finds that although plaintiffs evidence establishes a prima facie case in 
Brief of Appellant l 
the technical sense, it is unpersuasive." Id. '; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52 
(2003). 
Whether a former spouse is "residing" or cohabitating with another person for 
purposes of terminating alimony "is a mixed question of fact and law". Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669,671 (Utah 1985). "While we defer to the trial court's factual 
findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion 
for correctness." Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996). In 
"reviewing a trial court's actions in a divorce case, [the appellate court is] vested with 
broad equitable powers." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985). 
PRESERVATION. APPELLANT FILED AN OBJECTION TO FINDINGS & 
ORDER (R.444) AND A SUBSEQUENT OBJECTION TO FINDINGS AND 
OBJECTION TO NOTICE TO SUBMIT. (R.453). APPELLANT FILED A TRIAL 
BRIEF AND UPDATED TRIAL BRIEF, PRIOR TO TRIAL, OUTLINING THE 
LAW ON THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE. (R.246, 393). APPELLEE ALSO FILED A 
TRIAL MEMORANDUM PRIOR TO TRIAL. (R. 358). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code (2003) Section 30-3-5(9). "Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the 
former spouse is cohabitating with another person." 
Utah Code (1994) Section 30-3-5(6). 
1
 While Appellee's "Order of Dismissal" refers to the granting of a "directed verdict", the 
correct appellation is granting a "motion to dismiss". Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 581, 
584 (Utah App. 1999)("In the context of a bench trial, however, where there is no jury 
verdict, the directed verdict's procedural counterpart is a motion to dismiss.") 
2 
Utah Code (2003) Section 30-3-3(1). 
Utah Code (2003) Section 30-1-4.5(e) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41 Dismissal of actions, (b) Involuntary dismissal; 
effect thereof 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52. Findings by the court, (a) Effect. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties to this dispute were divorced by stipulation on July 25, 2001 after a 
long-term marriage. On June 10, 2002 Appellant filed a Verified Petition to Modify 
Divorce, alleging a reduction of income and cohabitation of Appellee. Appellant 
subsequently moved to dismiss his claim related to the reduction of income, as it was no 
longer necessary, on July 14, 2003 and the court so ordered July 29, 2003. After several 
continuances trial was finally held on September 22, 2003. Appellant presented his case 
and rested. Appellee moved for dismissal, which was granted at trial by the court, 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with instructions to file an 
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees. The Order of Dismissal was submitted to opposing counsel 
on September 30, 2003 and signed by the court October 10, 2003. A Judgment for 
Attorneys Fees against Appellant was entered October 16, 2003. 
Appellant filed an Objection to Findings & Order on October 14, 2003 and 
subsequent Objection to Findings & Objection to Notice to Submit on October 17, 2003. 
Appellee filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Objection to Findings on October 28, 
2003. The Objection was not submitted or ruled upon by the court. Appellant filed his 
Notice of Appeal on November 7, 2003. 
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This case was randomly assigned to mediation, which was unsuccessful. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in Kansas on March 23, 1971, and later divorced June 
25, 2001. R.6, 72. They had two children who were married adults at the time of the 
divorce. R.70. The divorce decree awarded substantial assets, real property and cash, to 
Appellee (hereinafter "Karen") and $3,100 per month in alimony. R.69-71. "A couple 
weeks after [the] divorce was final" Karen met Dane Gerkin (herinafter "Gerkin"), a 
tattoo artist, at Maddie's Salon in Roosevelt and she began dating him. R.525:l 12:22-25; 
525:114:7-12. Karen began spending the nights at Gerkin's house in August or 
September 2001. R. 525:115:17-116:8. They continued their relationship for about two 
and a half years until at least April 2003, though Karen claimed it was no longer a sexual 
relationship at the time of trial. R. 525:116:17-117:1; 525:147:6-7. 
In the divorce decree, Karen was awarded the marital home in Cedar View. R.75. 
Dane Gerkin resided in a pink house on the corner right across the street from the 
courthouse. R. 58. Karen's daughter, Sammy Fillingim, believed her mother lived with 
Dane Gerkin. R. 525:21:15. Karen had told Sammy that if Sammy could not get a hold 
of Karen, she could always find her at Gerkin's. R.525:22:6. Karen and Gerkin were 
seen together consistently for over a year and a half and ate together most of the time, 
either at Gerkin's house or out. R.525:76:15-24; 525:28:21-29:23; 525:121:1-3; 
525:120:18-22; 525:59:3-7; 525:60:3-7; 525:60:15-22; 525:61:15-18; 525:62:8; 
525:62:23-24; 525:63:10-18; 525:66:4-6; 525:92:20-24; 525:93:1; 525:94:11-25; 
525:101:5-102:7. During dozens of telephone calls between Karen and her daughter 
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Sammy, Karen stated she was at Gerkin's home. Sammy could usually reach Karen on 
her cell phone, not on the house phone at the home in Cedar View. R. 525:24:10-12,17-
19; 525:25:4-17. 
Karen's truck was seen at Gerkin's home about 50 times from April to August 
2002 by one witness and about 20 out of 30 days each month for over a year from May 
2002 to May 2003. R.525:50:22-51:5; 525;93:23 - 94:8. A private investigator 
conducting surveillance never saw the truck at Karen's home in Cedar View. 
R.525:71:15-21; 525:73:12. 
Karen paid Gerkin's electric bill and satellite bill because she was bored with TV 
R. 525:35:14-20. Karen purchased groceries for Gerkin to cook for both of them at his 
home. R. 525:34:13-19. Gerkin could drive Karen's truck whenever he wanted, and 
often did so without Karen in it. R. 525:91:5-17; 525:92:2-3; 525:144:24-143:1. 
Gerkin regularly took care of Karen, sometimes when Karen was ill. R.525:144:7-
11; 525:143:14-18. Karen preferred to go home with Dane Gerkin. R.525:31:4-10; 
525:31:23-32:23. Karen was arrested for DUI in January 2002. R. 525:50:22-51:5. 
After Karen lost her driver's license, Gerkin also ran her errands and took her to the 
doctor. R.525:144:16-23. 
Gerkin was seen at the Cedar View home when Karen was out of town in Texas, 
though Karen denies Gerkin has a key to that home. R. 525:103:17-104:17; 525:151:4-
11. Karen was seen alone at Gerkin's home on the porch, but it is unknown if Gerkin 
was inside at the time. R.525:95:5-7. 
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Karen and Gerkin had an ongoing sexual relationship for several months, if not 
years. Karen had bragged to Sammy about how good Dane was in bed and Sammy 
observed hickies on her mother. R. 525:28:9-15. 
Because of these observations by friends and family of the parties, Appellant 
(hereinafter referred to as "Heavy") believed that Karen was cohabitating with Dane 
Gerkin. At the same time Heavy had some substantial business reversals and his 
financial resources had decreased from the time of the divorce. Subsequently, in June 
2002 he filed a Verified Petition to Modify Divorce, eleven months after the divorce. 
Trial was held September 22, 2003. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court used the wrong standard in determining if the facts presented 
comprised cohabitation for purposes of terminating alimony. Cohabitation is a mixed 
question of law and fact, which requires evidence of common residency and sexual 
contact. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917 (UtahApp. 1995). The case law provides that 
once evidence of a common residence is proven between a former spouse and another 
person, it is the former spouse's burden to show that her relationship with another person 
is without sexual contact. Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 553 (Utah 1983). 
The evidence presented at trial showed that Appellee and Gerkin had a long-term 
relationship from July 2001 to at least April of 2003. They spent most of their nights 
together at Gerkin's home, as evidenced by the frequency of Appellee's truck located 
outside of his home and the content of telephone calls between Appellee and her 
daughter. Gerkin had free access to Karen's truck and was seen driving it with and 
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without Karen beside him. Karen paid expenses for Gerkin, including his electric and 
satellite bill and groceries. Gerkin cared for Karen and made sure she was all right, 
especially after Karen became ill. Gerkin was seen at Karen's home when she was out of 
town. Karen acknowledged there was a sexual relationship from the beginning, but 
claimed that it no longer existed at the time of trial. 
The trial court erred in stating that cohabitation meant to "hold yourself out to the 
world as married." R.525:159:22-24. It concluded that, even though it called Gerkin a 
"gigolo", because Appellee would not want to "spend the rest of her life with somebody 
like" Gerkin, who was a tattoo artist with long hair, she had not cohabitated with Gerkin. 
R.525:159:17-160:l. The court did not "care what the cases say" about this issue, and 
did not care "who has the burden", but ruled based upon its subjective assumptions about 
the appropriateness of Appellee's evident intent. R.525:14:2-3; 525:160:8-9. 
The trial court confused the elements of common law marriage and cohabitation. 
While there may be some overlap, cohabitation has specific factors to prove and a 
burden-shifting requirement not found necessary in common law marriage cases. The 
facts presented show that Karen and Gerkin shared a common residence and that they had 
a sexual relationship. Therefore, alimony should have been terminated. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant seeks to have this court overturn the trial court's dismissal of his 
Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce due to the cohabitation of Appellee with 
another person. Alimony terminates when the payee cohabitates with another person. 
§30-3-5(9) Utah Code (2003). Cohabitation "means the former spouse is residing with a 
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person of the opposite sex and engaging in sexual contact with that person." Sigg v. Sigg, 
905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah App. 1995).2 
I. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS 
When challenging a trial court's ruling concerning a motion to dismiss or directed 
verdict, Appellant is first obligated to "marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict." Neely v. Bennett, 448 UAR 14, 15 (Utah App. 2002). 
A. Marshalling the Evidence. 
The findings made by the court in this case are limited since Appellee presented 
no evidence during trial except upon cross-examination of Appellant's witnesses. The 
Order of Dismissal provides only the following finding, as prepared by Appellee's 
counsel: 
The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Petitioner, 
shows that the Respondent and Mr. Gerken had a friendship and a dating 
relationship. There was no evidence to show an intent or desire by the 
Respondent to move in or live with Mr. Gerken. The evidence did not 
establish that the Respondent was cohabitating with Mr. Gerken. The facts 
did not meet either the residency or the sexual relationship requirements, 
required by the case law to establish cohabitation. R.442. 
In the transcript of the trial proceedings, the court actually made a number of other 
observations, to wit: The court found that Karen had no intent to move in or cohabitate 
with Gerkin "until she became dependent on him for health and other reasons." R. 
525:159:12-16. It noted that Gerkin "was more like a gigolo" and that because Gerkin 
2
 The case of Garcia v. Garcia clarified that the new statute enacted in 1995 indicated 
that the sexual contact may be with another "person" of either sex. 460 UAR 27 (Utah 
App. 2002). 
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was "a guy that works in a beauty shop, doing tattoos with long hair, [Appellee] doesn't 
want to spend the rest of her life with somebody like that." R.525:159:17-19. The court 
concluded that cohabitation meant to "hold your self out to the world as being married" 
and surmised that, evidently because it assumed Appellee would not want to be married 
to someone like Gerkin, there was no cohabitation. R.525:159:24. 
In marshalling the evidence in support of the verdict, the following facts were 
presented to the court: 
1. Karen Sursa and Dane Gerkin had a friendship and dating relationship, 
but evidenced no intent or desire to live together. Not every telephone call 
between Karen and her daughter, Sammy, was when Karen was at Dane's 
home. R.525:37:18:21. On one occasion Sammy took Gerkin to the Cedar 
View home for Gerkin to pick up Karen's truck in order for him to pick up 
Karen from the airport. R. 525:42:7-10. Sometimes when Chad Richard, the 
investigator, saw Karen's truck in front of Gerkin's home, it was during the 
day. R.525:64:19-22. Mr. Richard acknowledged that Karen's truck could 
have been in the garage at Cedar View, which might explain why he never saw 
it there. R.525:65:8-13. Mr. Richard also acknowledged he did not always 
have his notebook with him and therefore, the second time he saw Karen 
outside of Gerkin's home, it was not recorded. Mr. Richard admitted he saw 
Karen with others besides Gerkin, including her daughters, her friends the 
Russells, and other women at a bar. R.525:64:19-22; R.525:65:3. Patsy Sursa, 
Appellant's wife, admitted that sometimes she saw Karen's mother driving 
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Karen's truck, but that was only during the last couple of months, prior to trial. 
R.525:98:5-7. Karen Sursa testified that she and Gerkin never went to the 
local ballpark. R.525:121:l 1-14. She claimed she had no key to Gerkin's 
home, he did not have one for her home, and she had never been to Gerkin's 
home when he was not there. R.525:151:4-l 1. The $ 100 payment she paid to 
the electric company for Gerkin's electric bill was actually payment for a 
picture he drew for her. R.525:133:20-23. The other checks she wrote and 
gave4o him were for him to run errands for her, for groceries, the pharmacy, 
and gas, after she lost her license. R.525:133:12-17. She never gave Gerkin 
money, but bought things from him, usually drawings. R.525:122:8-15. 
2. Karen Sursa and Dane Gerkin did not have a permanent sexual 
relationship like husband and wife. Karen testified she and Gerkin had a 
sexual relationship the first few months of their relationship but that now their 
relationship was platonic, though they would occasionally cuddle. R.525: 
166:1-8; 525:145:1-13, 20-146:7. 
B. The Legal Standard 
Though these facts provide some evidence for Karen's claim that she did not 
cohabitate with Gerkin, they do not offset the overwhelming evidence presented by 
Appellant. Whether someone is residing with another "is a mixed question of fact and 
law" and therefore very fact specific. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 
App. 1996). Factors the court has looked at in the past include sharing living expenses, 
open access to each other's residence, eating together, sharing food expenses, keeping 
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clothing or toiletries in the other residence, using the same furniture, possession of a key 
to the other's residence, the presence of vehicles, and time spent at each other's 
residence. See, Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2 159 (Utah App. 1996); Siggv. Sigg, 905 
P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995); Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). 
In Haddow, the court relied upon the boyfriend's lack of open access to appellant's 
home to deny cohabitation. Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673. There was no 
furniture moved into appellant's home and no items of personal property except toiletries 
and a few clothes. Id. The boyfriend left a van at the home, but only for storage 
purposes. The boyfriend had dinner with appellant five or six times a week and stayed 
until 10:30 or midnight, often returning in the morning for coffee, and spent the night 
about once a week. Id. at 670-671. The boyfriend kept a few clothes in appellant's home 
so he could shower there between work and going out for the evening with appellant and 
appellant sometimes laundered them. He used appellant's address but also used his 
parents' and his ex-wife's. The only financial contributions made were to reimburse 
appellant for food he ate. Id. 
In Sigg v. Sigg, the parties acknowledged cohabitation had occurred but disputed at 
what point in time it commenced. 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah App. 1995). The court ruled 
that cohabitation began even when the parties had separate residences. It found they 
shared living expenses, had open access to each other's residences, ate together and 
shared food expenses, kept clothing in the same residence, used the same furniture and 
"otherwise lived as though they were husband and wife". Id. at 918. 
11 
The court found cohabitation in Pendleton because the boyfriend, who traveled 
extensively, spent ninety percent of his time, or four to five nights a week, with appellee 
when he was in town. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996). He 
had a key and came and went three to four times daily, even when appellee was not there. 
Id, They ate almost all meals together either at appellee's home or dining out Id, While 
the boyfriend kept some clothing at appellee's home, he also kept belongings in his car, 
in his apartment and at the home of his estranged wife. Id, There was no sharing of 
living expenses and the court was unmoved by the fact that none of the boyfriend's 
clothes were at appellee's apartment at the time of trial. Id. 
The standard for concluding that the facts comprise cohabitation for purposes of 
terminating alimony should be distinguished from those sustaining a common law 
marriage. There is no requirement in proving cohabitation that the relevant parties "hold 
themselves out as married." R.525:159:24. The only relevant inquiries are if "the former 
spouse is residing with a person . . . and engaging in sexual contact with the person." 
Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah App. 1995). 
The court should clarify that the factors it looks at to determine if cohabitation 
exists are an objective, not subjective standard. While the trial court in this case found 
that (1) Dane Gerkin was like a "gigolo" and, (2) in its mind, a long-haired tattoo artist 
was not someone that Karen Sursa should "want to spend the rest of her life with", this is 
not necessarily a basis to deny that cohabitation existed. R.525:159:17-20; 525:160:1. 
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C. Insufficiency of the Evidence. 
Contrary to the conclusion of the court, based upon its limited findings, the evidence 
presented showed that Karen and Gerkin were cohabitating "for purposes of an alimony 
analysis." Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 161. "While [the appellate courts] defer 
to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, [the 
appellate courts] review its ultimate conclusion for correctness." Id. "Whether dismissal 
was appropriate for failure to make a prima facie case is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness." Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1999). The conclusion 
of the trial court should have been that Karen had cohabitated with Dane Gerkin, thus 
terminating alimony. Many of the relevant facts were omitted from the findings of the 
court, as provided below. 
L Karen Sursa and Dane Gerkin had a dating relationship with no intent to 
live together. Contrary to this finding the evidence showed that Karen and 
Dane had a long term relationship in which they spent nearly all their available 
time together, publicly and privately, shared assets and expenses, and cared for 
each other, "akin to husband and wife". 
a. Long-term relationship. Karen started dating Gerkin a couple weeks after 
the divorce was final in July 2001. R.525:l 12:22-25; 525:114:7-12. Karen 
began spending the nights at Dane's house in August or September 2001. 
R. 525:115:17-116:8. They continued their relationship for about two and a 
half years until at least April 2003, though Karen claimed it was no longer a 
sexual relationship at the time of trial. R. 525:116:17-117:1; 525:147:6-7. 
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b. Majority of time together at Gerkin's home. Karen's daughter, Sammy 
Fillingim, testified that she believed her mother lived with Dane Gerkin. R. 
525:21:15. Karen had told Sammy that if Sammy could not get a hold of 
Karen, she could always find her at Dane's. R.525:22:6. In fact when 
Sammy could not find her mother, she located her at Dane Gerkin's home. 
R. 525:22:2-7. Sammy had picked up her mother from Dane's home 
before. R. 525:44:20-24. 
c. They shared Karen's truck, Sammy saw her mother's truck at Dane's 
house "about 50 times" in the five months between April and August 2002, 
and about 10-15 times before Karen was arrested for DUI in January 2002 
and lost her license. R. 525:50:22-51:5. Karen's truck was seen parked 
outside of Dane Gerkin's home about 20 out of 30 days each month for 
over a year from May 2002 through May 2003. R.525:93:23 to 94:8. 
From Februaiy to March 2002 a private investigator never saw anyone or 
Karen's truck at the house in Cedar View. R.525:71:15-21; 525:73:12. 
d. Telephone Contact Indicated Karen Usually at Gerkins\ Whenever 
Sammy would call her mother between April and August 2002, she would 
try calling at the Cedar View house with no answer and then would reach 
her on her cell phone. R.525:24:10-12, 17-19; 525:25:4-17. Sammy called 
Karen about 20-30 times during that time period and Karen also called 
Sammy about 20-30 times during that time period. R. 525:25:23-25; 
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525:18-19. During these phone calls Karen would tell Sammy that she, 
Karen, was at Dane Gerkin's home. R. 525:27:9-23. 
e. They Shared Expenses, Karen had told Sammy Karen had paid Dane's 
electric bill because she felt sorry for him and that she had paid Dane's 
satellite TV bill because she was bored with TV and wanted to watch 
satellite. R. 525:35:14-20. Karen purchased groceries because Dane 
cooked for her at his home. R. 525:34:13-19. Karen and Dane were seen 
going into Dane's home carrying what appeared to be groceries. 
R.525:76:15-24. 
f. Gerkin Cared for Karen, On one occasion, when Karen was taken to the 
hospital after an overdose of pain pills; though family and friends were 
present, Karen preferred to go home with Dane Gerkin. R.525:31:4-10; 
525:31:23-32:23. Dane frequently and regularly took care of Karen, stayed 
with her and made sure Karen was all right, sometimes when Karen was ill. 
R.525:144:7-ll; 525:143:14-18. After Karen lost her driver's license he 
also ran her errands and took her to the doctor. R.525:144:16-23. 
g. They Appeared Publicly Together. Karen and Dane attended family 
social gatherings together and were publicly affectionate. R. 525:28:21-
29:23; 525:121:1-3. They also ate out together regularly once or twice a 
week. R. 525:120:18-22. Other witnesses indicated Karen and Dane were 
seen around town or driving together in Karen's truck dozens of times. R. 
525:59:3-7; 525:60:3-7; 525:60:15-22; 525:61:15-18; 525:62:8; 525:62:23-
15 
24; 525:63:10-18; 525:66:4-6; 525:92:20-24; 525:93:1; 525:94:11-25; 
525:101:5-102:7. Karen and Dane were also seen leaving the house at 
Cedar View with Dane driving Karen's truck. R.525:102:11-22. 
h. They Had Access to Home and Assets. Dane was seen at the Cedar View 
home when Karen was out of town in Texas, though Karen denies Dane has 
a key to that home. R. 525:103:17-104:17; 525:151:4-11. Dane drove 
Karen's truck often without Karen as well, whenever he wanted. 
R.525:91:5-17; 525:92:2-3; 525:144:24-143:1. 
2. Karen Sursa and Dane Gerkin did not have a sexual relationship that 
qualified as the requisite factor in cohabitation for purposes of 
terminating alimony. Contrary to this conclusion by the trial court, Karen 
and Gerkin dated for about two and a half years, from right after the divorce 
until at least April 2003. R. 525:116:17-117:1. Karen bragged to her daughter 
Sammy about how good Dane was in bed and Sammy observed hickies on 
Karen's neck. R.525:28:9-15. Karen told Sammy the hickies were also on her 
breasts. R. 525:28:13-15. Though Karen claimed it was no longer a sexual 
relationship at the time of trial, even if true, this does not negate the fact that 
they had had an ongoing sexual relationship. R.525:147:6-7. If, in fact, the 
sexual part of the relationship waned because of Karen's health, Gerkin and 
Karen continued to "cuddle" and care for one another. Such a relationship is 
exactly like that of a conjugal relationship, which waxes and wanes as 
circumstances allow. 
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In spite of the limited findings stated by the court in its Order of Dismissal, the 
omitted facts provided above show sufficient evidence of cohabitation for purposes of 
terminating alimony. 
II. APPELLANT HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE COMMON RESIDENCE 
The Appellant has the burden to prove that the former spouse is residing with 
another person. Once this is established, the alimony obligation is terminated unless the 
former spouse receiving the alimony can show that the relationship is without any sexual 
contact. Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 553 (Utah 1983). This allocation of burden was 
clearly stated in the statute enacted prior to 1995. Currently while both residency and 
sexual contact are required to terminate alimony, the burden of proof cited in Wacker has 
not been overturned, in spite of a change in the language of the statute. Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah App. 1996) n.l.3 This burden allocation is reasonable 
unless we want to return to the days of undisclosed video cameras and surreptitiously 
removing sheets for evidentiary purposes. Even in Haddow, the court held under the old 
statute "that there are two key elements to be considered in determining whether 
appellant was cohabiting . . . common residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal 
association." Haddow v. Haddow, 101 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). However, the burden 
The earlier statute was §30-3-5(6), which provided: "Any order of the court that a party 
pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or 
association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume." 
In 1995 the statute was amended and changed to its current form in 30-3-5(9) to 
provide: "Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating 
with another person." 
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is separate and apart from the elements that must be shown. "Once residence is 
established, alimony obligations are terminated unless the recipient can show that the 
relationship is 'without sexual contact.'" Id, citing Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 533 
(Utah 1983). 
Once Appellant provided the court evidence of a common residence between 
Appellee and another individual, it should be Apellee's burden to disprove the 
presumption of an ongoing sexual relationship "akin to that existing between husband 
and wife." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah App. 1985). Appellee provided 
no evidence that her relationship with Dane Gerkin was "without sexual contact." 
Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 553 (Utah 1983). In fact, she acknowledged there was a 
sexual relationship, but claimed it was not "akin to husband and wife". Whether 
Appellant or Appellee had the burden regarding sexual contact, Appellee acknowledged 
sexual contact for a period of time and such contact was borne out by the evidence 
presented. 
IIL APPELLEE SHARED A COMMON RESIDENCE WITH DANE GERKIN 
Common residency is the "sharing of a common abode that both parties 
consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." 
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 553 (Utah 1983). While the court has found common 
residency when the parties each own a separate residence, there should be indications a 
party can come and go, while a visitor coincides his visits with the presence of the person 
he is visiting. Id. at 160 {citing Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 673 (Utah 1985). The 
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sharing of living expenses, while not a requisite element of residency, may be relevant. 
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160-161. 
The weight of the evidence presented to the court shows that Karen Sursa and 
Dane Gerkin shared a residence for a substantial period of time. Karen stayed at Dane 
Gerkins home the majority of the time from August 2001 through May 2003, and relied 
upon Dane to take care of her, cook for her, run errands for her and otherwise "act akin to 
husband and wife." They ate their meals together, they shared a vehicle, and Karen paid 
some of Dane's expenses to make it more convenient for her to stay at his home. Karen's 
belongings, including blankets and clothes, were seen at Dane's home. Dane was also 
seen at Karen's home when she was out of town, indicating open access. 
IV. CONJUGAL SEXUAL CONTACT EXISTED 
Appellee acknowledged an ongoing sexual relationship with Dane Gerkin. The 
only disputed fact is when or if that sexual relationship terminated The legal question is 
whether the sexual contact involved was "relatively permanent". Haddow v. Haddow, 
707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah App. 1985). The court found a "relatively permanent sexual 
relationship" where the parties had dated exclusively for 14 months and Mr. Hudson 
spent at least one night a week together. Id. Here the exclusive relationship admittedly 
went on for at least two and a half years. The evidence was that the parties were together 
most of the time for at least over a year. 
Appellee presented no evidence there was no ongoing sexual relationship other 
than her self-serving testimony. There was no evidence Karen dated anyone other than 
Gerkin or that the exclusivity of their arrangement had changed. Karen admitted sexual 
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relations with Gerkin from either July/August or December 2001 extending at least 
several months. R.525:114:17-21. The Petition to Modify was filed in June 2002, less 
than a year after the divorce. The requisite permanency of the ongoing sexual relationship 
was clearly proven for that time period, primarily by Karen's own testimony. 
V, USE OF THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD SHOWS COHABITATION 
The court used the wrong standard by concluding that cohabitation meant to "hold 
yourself out to the world as being married". R.525:159:24. This is the standard for a 
common law marriage, not cohabitation for purposes of terminating alimony. §30-1-
4.5(1 )(e) Utah Code (2003). The court actually found that Mr. Gerkin "was more like a 
gigolo" and that because Mr. Gerkin was "a guy that works in a beauty shop, doing 
tattoos with long hair, [s]he doesn't want to spend the rest of her life with somebody like 
that." R.525:159:17-19. 
When Appellant's counsel attempted to reference the relevant cases, the court 
stated that it did not "care what the cases say. That's the way I see it." R.525:160:8-9. 
The court also stated it did not "care who has the burden while you're presenting your 
case". R.525:14:2-3. 
Whether it would make sense for Appellee to "want to spend the rest of her life 
with somebody like" Mr. Gerkin, is not indicative of whether or not Appellee was 
cohabitating with him. They shared a residence, vehicle, some expenses, meals and had 
an ongoing relationship in which Mr. Gerkin cared for Appellee as a husband cares for a 
wife. The court even recognized that Appellee was "dependent on him [Gerkin] for 
health or other reasons." R.525:259:16. That dependency, combined with the other 
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evidence provided to the court was sufficient to show the common residency requisite for 
cohabitation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, it is clear that Appellant has made a 
prima facie case of cohabitation and therefore, granting the Motion to Dismiss was error. 
Appellant move this court to reverse the trial court and conclude that Appellee, Karen 
Sursa, cohabitated with Dane Gerkin. In the alternative, the court should deny Appellee's 
Motion to Dismiss and remand the case to the trial court for the completion of the trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ day of October 2004. 
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C 
B 
^ 
fTORlE D. FOWLKE 
DONALD E. McCANDLESS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ^1 , day of October 2004,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to: 
Clark B. Allred 
Allred McClellan & Trotter, P.C. 
121 West Main Street 
Vernal Utah 84078 
Telephone: 435 789 4908 
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ADDENDUM 1 
JOHN C BEASLIN, P.C., #0258 
Attorney foi Plaintiff 
185 North Vernal Avenue, Suite 1 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435)789-1201 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH D. SURSA, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
KAREN J. SURSA, 
Defendant. 
> DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 004000114 DA 
Judge: John R. Anderson 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing before the above-entitled court on the 16l day of 
July 2001 before the Honorable John R. Anderson. The Plaintiff was present in court and 
represented by his counsel, John C. Beaslin and Kenneth G. Anderton. The Defendant was 
present in court and was represented by her counsel, Clark A. McClellan. Three (3) months have 
elapsed from the date the Complaint of the Plaintiff was filed. The Plaintiff testified with 
reference to the jurisdictional grounds and the parties indicated to the court that they had reached 
a settlement in this matter and counsel for the Plaintiff dictated the stipulation of the parties. 
Based upon the stipulation and the court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in this matter it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
w 
' //,• 
1. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant that shall 
become permanent and final upon entry into the computer by the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
The following-described property is hereby awarded to the Defendant, Karen Sursa: 
A. 19.77 acres of real property located in Section 30, Township 1 South Range 1 
West, USM, together with the improvements thereon. Defendant, however, is awarded the 
property subject to her paying the remaining balance due and owing on the mortgage to Zions 
Bank in Roosevelt, Utah, and holding Plaintiff harmless there from. The approximate mortgage 
balance is the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($74,500.00). The Defendant is ordered to make all future payments on said property 
commencing August 10, 2001. The Defendant is ordered to be responsible for all taxes and 
insurance on said property for the year 2001 and all subsequent years. 
B. A Trust Deed Note and Contract balance with Doug Fillingham and Sammi 
M. Fillingham with an approximate balance of FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($40,000.00). 
Said note is dated November 1, 1996. Plaintiff will assign his interest in said contract and note 
to the Defendant. 
C. A riding mower located on the real property described in paragraph 5A. above 
is hereby awarded to the Defendant. 
D. An account with Merrell Lynch in Salt Lake City, Utah, account #421-
BlMl6(40Ik) in the approximate sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
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TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($46,525.00). Plaintiff will assign his interest in said account to the 
Defendant. 
E. An account with Merrell Lynch in Salt Lake City, Utah, account #421-
82M32(SEP account) in the approximate sum of SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($65,200.00). Plaintiff will assign his interest in said account to the Defendant. 
F. Household items of furniture and furnishings located in the home set forth 
above are hereby awarded to the Defendant subject, however, to the Plaintiff receiving his 
personal property. 
G. The additional sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($148,000.00) cash. Plaintiff has paid to the Defendant the sum of SEVENTY-
FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($74,000.00), receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, on 
July 16, 2001. The remaining balance of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($74,000.00) will be payable commencing with a payment of at least FIVE THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($5,000.00) on August 16, 2001 with a like amount on the sixteenth (16th) day of 
each and every month thereafter until February 16, 2002. Interest on said amount will be at eight 
percent (8%) per annum commencing from July 16, 2001 until paid in full. The entire amount is 
to be paid in full on or before February 16, 2002. If there remains any unpaid principal amount 
and interest as of February 16, 2002, then the Defendant will be entitled to a judgment in that 
amount forthwith without further notice to the Plaintiff. 
H. Each of the parties is hereby ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs 
of court incurred in this matter. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the appraisal fees to 
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Dale Cameron. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay for any debts or obligations that were to 
be paid on her Order to Show Cause, which was not heard by the court. 
I. The Plaintiff, commencing on August 1, 2001, and each month thereafter is 
ordered to pay to the Defendant the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($3A 00.00) per month. A separate account will be established at the bank for an automatic 
deposit to Defendant's account each month. Alimony will continue until such time as it is either 
modified or terminated by the court or upon the remarriage or co-habitation of the Defendant. 
6. The Plaintiff, Kenneth Sursa, is hereby awarded the following property: 
A. All of the parties' interest in Kappen Enterprises, Inc., a Utah Corporation, 
dba Tiger Tanks. The Defendant will execute and surrender any stock certificates that might be 
in her name. Right, title and interest to the said stock are hereby awarded to the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant will have no interest in the business. 
B. A fifth-wheel trailer 
C. Two (2) horses 
D. A horse trailer 
E. All personal property belonging to the Plaintiff as set forth above that is in the 
home awarded to the Defendant is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff along with all items of 
household furniture and furnishings in the apartment in Roosevelt, Utah belonging to the 
Plaintiff. 
7. Both parties are hereby ordered to sign all documents, including assignments, to 
transfer assets to each other pursuant to the stipulation. 
4 
1
 J ' . 
8. The parties have agreed to a mutual restraining order and it is so ordered by the court. 
DATED the }> day of July 2001. 
APPROVED BY: 
Kenneth G. Andedbn 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
UM a. i* 
Clark A. McClellan 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 2 
. 6 . ' ^ ?\C2 
The Law Offices of 
LANCE DEAN - #6206 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal, Ut 84078 
Telephone: (435) 789-4900 
Fax.: (435) 789-4999 
V 
m JO? 
• i » , , r 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH D. SURSA, 
Petitioner, 
KAREN J. SURSA, 
Respondent. 
VERIFIED 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
No.: 004000114 DA 
JUDGE: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Kenneth D. Sursa, by and through his attorney, Lanee Dean, 
and petitions the Court for a Modification of the Alimony provisions of the Divorce Decree 
signed by the Court on July 25, 2001, by the Honorable John R. Anderson. As grounds, the 
Petitioner alleges as follows: 
1. By a stipulated Decree of Divorce on or about July 25, 2001, the Petitioner was 
divorced from Karen J. Sursa, the Respondent. 
2. Paragraph 21 of the Divorce Decree specifically states 
The Petitioner, commencing on August 1, 2001 and each month there after 
is ordered to pay to the Respondent THREE Tl IOUSAND ONE 
HUNDRED DOLLARS ($3Ju0.O0) per month. A separate account VM'II be 
established at the bank for an automatic deposit to Respondent's account 
each month. Alimony will continue until such time as it is either modified 
of terminated by the Court or upon the marriage or the cohabitation of the 
Respondent. 
3. Since the Divorce Decree was entered by the Court a substantial and material 
change of circumstances has occurred requiring a modification of the alimony 
provision of that decree. 
4. The Petitioner pleads two alternative grounds justifying modification of the 
alimony provision as follows: 
(a) Based upon nearly two months of surveillance of the Respondent, on 
information and belief the Respondent is having sexual relations with 
another man namely Dane Gerken, and is cohabitating, which cohabitation 
justifies a termination of the alimony provisions of the divorce decree. In 
the alternative, 
(b) The Petitioner has had a financial reversal making it impossible for him to 
pay the court ordered amount of $3,100.00 per month for alimony, 
justifying a reduction in the monthly amount he should be required to pay. 
5. It is just and appropriate for the court to modify the current alimony provisions 
now in effect between the parties. 
6. The Petitioner has had to employ the services of an attorney for this modillcation 
and requests an award of the attorney's fees for the necessity of bringing this 
action. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the court: 
. 0 . 
C"'} 
1. Terminate the Petitioner's requirement to pay alimony, or in the alternative to 
modify the monthly amount of alimony that Petitioner pays; 
2. To for an award of attorney's fees for the necessity of bringing this action; 
3. Any and all other relieve the court deems just and proper. 
DATED this day of .2002. / _ 
a-H(t 
Lah^e Dean 
Attorney for Petitioner 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
KENNETH D. SURSA, having been duly sworn on oath deposes and says that she 
is the Petitioner and that she has read the foregoing VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY, 
knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be true. 
J£&U*UJJL &Mrs a. 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
 :SO_ day of / 7 V U 1^2002. 
—* ""•flotary Puf i lEfn / , 
JUDITH R.HUBER . < ,-^\ , -_* < > < )
 v , L // . g i 
'I M^ffiS£^» I V j^sjOTARY PUBLIC FOR UTAH 
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ADDENDUM 3 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
OCT t 0 2003 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 BY ^ / DEPUTY 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH D. SURSA, ) 
) ORDER OF 
Petitioner, ) DISMISSAL 
vs. ) 
KAREN J. SURSA, ) Civil No. 004000114 DA 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial 
on September 22, 2003. The Petitioner, Kenneth E. Sursa, was 
present with his attorney Bryan Sidwell. The Respondent, Karen J. 
Sursa, was present with her attorney Clark B Allred. The 
Petitioner called several witnesses and then rested. The 
Respondent moved for a directed verdict and requested that the 
Petitioner's petition be dismissed. The Court having heard the 
evidence and argument from counsel and having reviewed the case law 
and other information provided granted the motion and based thereon 
makes and enters the following order. 
1. The issue before the Court was whether the Court should 
terminate the Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony on the claim 
that the Respondent was cohabitating with Dane Gerken. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(10), the Petitioner 
who is seeking to terminate alimony, had the burden to establish 
that the Respondent, Karen J. Sursa, was cohabitating with Dane 
Gerken. 
3. The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Petitioner, shows that the Respondent and Mr. Gerken had a 
friendship and a dating relationship. There was no evidence to 
show an intent or desire by the Respondent to move in or live with 
Mr. Gerken. The evidence did not establish that the Respondent was 
cohabitating with Mr. Gerken. The facts did not meet either the 
residency or the sexual relationship requirements, required by the 
case law to establish cohabitation. 
4. The Petitioner dismissed his alternative claim to 
reduce alimony based on a change of financial circumstances prior 
to the trial. 
5. Because the Court granted a directed verdict evidence 
was not received on the issue of reimbursement of legal fees. The 
Respondent had submitted to the Court an affidavit regarding the 
attorney fees and costs she has incurred thru September 15, 2003. 
The Court Therefore Orders as follows: 
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1. The Petitioner's Petition to Modify is dismissed. 
2. The Respondent is to file with the court documentation 
and affidavits regarding the income, expenses and ability to pay 
legal fees and costs and supplement the affidavit regarding the 
fees she incurred. If the Petitioner disagrees with the 
information provided or desires to submit additional information on 
the issue of whether the court should award fees and if so how much 
he may file that additional information and an objection within ten 
days of the date Respondent furnishes her information. If no 
objection is received, the Court, based on the information provided 
will determine that issue. If there is an objection the Court will 
then schedule a hearing on the attorney's fee issue. 
DATED this ru day of 
District Court Judqe 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of McKEACHNIE, 
ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P. C. attorneys for Respondent herein 
and hereby certify that I served the attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
on Petitioner by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an 
envelope addressed to: 
BRYAN SEDWELL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
134 WEST MAIN, SUITE 202 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 30r^ 
day of September, 2003. 
CHEREE BROTHERSON 
ADDENDUM 4 
BRYAN SIDWELL #7625 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal UT 84078 
Telephone: (435) 789-4900 
Fax: (435) 789-4999 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
7h 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH D. SURSA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS AND 
* ORDER 
KAREN J. SURSA, * Civil No. 004000114 
Respondent. Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
COMES NOW, Kenneth D. Sursa, and objects to the Findings and Order and requests 
additional time to review the tape of the hearing held on September 22, 2003 
DATED this  *fi\ day of October, 2003. 
& ^ XJ.^0 i 
Bryan Sidwell 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that on this / of October, 2003 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTION TO FINDINGS AND ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid addressed as 
follows: 
Clark Allred 
72 North 300 East (123-4) 
Roosevelt, UT. 84066 
Angiefeiddoway 
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ADDENDUM 5 
BRYAN SIDWELL(#7625) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF D U ^ & S J ^ C £ ^ f f ^ T Y 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
meTRicT COURT 
DUcSiNECOWTY,UTAH 
OCT \ ? 2003 
IN 
KENNETH D. SURSA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
KAREN J. SURSA, 
Respondent. 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS AND 
OBJECTION TO NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
FOR DECISION 
Case No. 00400(jl4 
Judge Anderson 
COMES NOW petitioner and objects to the following. 
1. The petitioner objects to the findings which state that Karen Sursa and Dane Gerkin 
had a dating relationship and that the were just friends. The court stated that they had a dating 
relationship, but did not state they were friends. Instead the court stated that Dane Gerkin was 
more like a gigolo. 
2. In addition, the findings need to include that the court found that the parties had no 
intention of staying together in a permanent relationship as husband and wife. 
3. It should be noted that the petitioner believes that the court used the wrong standard in 
determining who had the burden of proving sexual contact. 
4. It should be noted that the petitioner believes that the court used the wrong standard in 
1 
determining whether Karen Sursa was residing with another person.. The petitioner believes the 
court used a standard that the parties residing together must have an intention of permanently 
residing together as husband and wife. 
5. Petitioner objects to the Notice to submit for decision, because the petitioner objected 
in a timely manner. Rule 4-504 of Rules of Judicial Administration states that an objection 
should be made within five days. Rule 6, of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure allows three 
additional days for mailing. In addition, Rule 6 states that when the time period is less than 11 
days Saturdays, Sundays and holidays should not be counted. Therefore, the petitioner objected 
in a timely manner and requested additional time. 
6. The petitioner should be awarded attorney fees for having to answer this matter. 
DATED this _ j i i day of , ' ; ' 4 » ^ ,2003. 
" t ^ sj( o»^_ j\r-y/>r* *J 
Bryan Sidwell 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was senj |p Clark A. 
Allred at 121 West Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84078, by hand delivering Oct^tyr')5, 2003. 
Jamie Blanchard 
J 
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ADDENDUM 6 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
OCT 2 8 2003 
JOANNEMCKK.CLERK^ 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH D. SURSA, 
vs, 
KAREN J. SURSA, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO OBJECTION TO FINDINGS AND 
OBJECTION TO NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
FOR DECISION 
Civil No. 004000114 DA 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Respondent submits the following memorandum in opposition 
to the Petitioner's Objection To Findings and Objection to Notice 
to Submit For Decision. 
1. The Court has signed and entered it's Order of 
Dismissal. The findings set forth therein are accurate and 
consistent with the Court's ruling. 
2. The time period in which the Petitioner had to make 
appropriate objection passed and the Court has properly signed the 
Order. 
?7 
DATED this ^ 9th day of October, 2003. 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, 
McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C 
Attorneys for Respondent 
By: { 
,~CL£ IrkBAmid 
V 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of McKEACHNIE, 
ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P. C. attorneys for Respondent herein 
and hereby certify that I served the attached MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO OBJECTION TO FINDINGS AND OBJECTION TO NOTICE TO 
SUBMIT FOR DECISION on Petitioner by placing a true and correct 
copy thereon in an envelope addressed to: 
BRYAN SEDWELL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
134 WEST MAIN, SUITE 202 
VERNAL, UTAH 84 078 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the £CH'rff 
day of October, 2003. 
i 
i ^ ^ f S - w — 
CHEREE BROTHERSON 
ADDENDUM 7 
Bryan Sidwell #7625 
Attorney for Petitioner 
134 West main. Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Tele (435) 789-4900 
Fax (435) 789-4999 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH D. SURSA ) TRIAL BRIEF 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 004000114 
KAREN J. SURSA ) Judge A^LynrrPayne" 
Respondent. ) '') |'.>o \ IV» -• "C_A r4 
COMES NOW, the petitioner and submits the following trial brief: 
ISSUE 
Should aHmony in the above entitled matter be terminated, because of cohabitation on the 
part of the respondent? 
LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Prior to 1995 the Utah statute governing termination of alimony based on cohabitation 
stated that alimony may be terminated if the recipient was "residing with a person of the opposite 
sex". After 1995 the statute was changed and states that alimony terminates if the recipient is 
cohabitating with another person. 
Although the language of the statute has changed the Courts use the same standard of 
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review for interpreting the language of the statute. 
The version of the statute in force at the time of this action uses the term 
"residing but makes clear that both residency and sexual contact are required 
and required to terminate alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 20-3-5(6)(1989). The 
divorce decree refers to "Cohabitation" as a basis for terminating alimony, 
as does the most recent version of the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) 
(Supp. 1995). The semantic distinction is inconsequential. Cohabitation 
is comprised of the same two elements: (\) common residency and (2)sexual 
contact evidencing a conjugal association. Pendleton v. Pendleton. 918 P.2d 159 
(Utah 1996) citing Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The petitioner has the burden to establish that the former spouse is "residing" with a 
person of the opposite sex. Once residence is established, then the burden shifts and alimony 
obligations are terminated unless the recipient can show that the relationship is "without sexual 
contact". Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985) citing Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 
533 (Utah 1983). See also Hill v. Hill 968 P.2d 866 (Utah 1998) and Pendleton v. Pendleton, 
918 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996). 
In Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (1995), the court found that the people in question resided 
together although they had separate condominiums, because they had open access to each other's 
condominiums. Id. 
The primary focus of the court in determining residency is whether the person travels 
freely in and out of the home. Two factors used to determine free access to the home are 1) 
whether the person has a key to the home and 2) whether the person spends time there when the 
other person is not there. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996). Other factors the 
court may use in determining residency are: where did they eat their meals and are clothing kept 
at the house. Id. 
2 
'The person seeking to avoid his or her alimony obligation because his or her former 
spouse is residing with a member of the opposite sex has the initial burden of proof to show that 
the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex; once this is established, the 
alimony obligation is terminated unless the former spouse receiving the alimony can show that 
the relationship is without any sexual contact." Katherine D. Black and Stephen T. Black, 
Family Law in Utah, second edition, p. 153 (1997). 
DATED this 12th day of June, 2003. 
Bryanv Sid well 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the trial brief was sent to the office of Clark 
Allred at 121 West Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84078, by placing it in the U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, on July 12, 2003. 
Bryan Sid well 
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ADDENDUM 8 
Bryan Sidwell 
Attorney at Law 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
September 16, 2003 
Honorable John R. Anderson 
RE: Updated Trial Brief Sursa v. Sursa Case Ab- OOVOOOJIV Oh 
Dear Judge Anderson: 
The following is an updated Trial Brief. The original trial brief was filed prior to the first 
scheduled trial date several months ago. Also enclosed is a courtesy copy of relevant case law. 
One of the legal issues that will be present for the courts determination has to do with the 
burden of proof. The petitioner believes that he has the burden to show that the respondent 
Karen Sursa is residing with another person, then the burden shifts to the respondent to show that 
she did not have sexual relations. 
Relevant case law is Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P. 2d 669, (Utah 1985). "Once residence 
is established, alimony obligations are terminated unless the recipient can show that the 
relationship is "without sexual contact". Id. at 672. The statute that Haddow was interpreted 
under was changed in 1995. In Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996), a case that 
was decided after the language change in the statute, the court stated. In Pendleton, the court 
compares the statutory language under the old statute and the language under the new statute and 
states, "the semantic distinction is inconsequential". Id- at 160. In Pendleton, the court 
reaffirmed the the Haddow standard by stating, "any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further established by the 
person receiving alimony that thet relationship or association is without any sexual contact, 
payment of alimony shall resume." (Underline added). Id. at 160. In Hill v. Hill, 968 P. 2d 866 
(App Ct. 1998), the court stated, "accordingly, we conclude the trial court correctly followed the 
supreme court's direction by applying the Haddow definition of cohabitation in this case. For 
further discussion of this issue I have enclosed three pages from a treatise on familly law. 
Katherine D. Black and Stephen T. Black, Family Law in Utah second edition. 1997. 
The court must also determine whether Karen Sursa has been residing with Dane Gerken 
and whether they have had sexual relations. In determining with Karen Sursa is residing the 
court should consider the following: 
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1. Portable possessions in the other home. 
2. Sharing of living expenses 
paying mortgage, utilities etc. 
3. Eating together and shared food expenses 
4. Duration of staying with other person 
5. Whether they have a key 
6. Whether they are free to come and go 
7. Share vehicles 
The cases that will aid the court regarding residence are Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 
(1995); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P,2d 159 (App. Ct. 1996) and Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 
669 (1985). It should be noted that in Sigg v. Sigg, the court found that the parties were 
cohabitating even though they each had there own condominium. 
Yours Truly, 
Bryan Sidwell 
Attorney for Petitioner 
cc: Clark Allred attorney for Respondent sent on September 16,2003. 
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ADDENDUM 9 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-392 8 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH D. SURSA, 
) TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
KAREN J. SURSA, ) Civil No. 004000114 DA 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
Respondent Karen Sursa submits the following Memorandum in 
support of her position at trial on the Petitioner's Petition to 
Amend the Decree, 
Relevant Facts 
1. The parties were divorced from each other pursuant to 
a Decree of Divorce dated July 21, 2001. 
2. The parties, prior to the divorce, had been married for 
a period of thirty years. Respondent was 16 years of age when she 
married the Petitioner. The parties had two daughters who had 
reached their majority age at the time of the divorce. 
V 
3. Respondent did not work during the marriage, and has 
not worked outside the home at any time during or after the 
marriage. Respondent cared for the parties' children, and stayed 
at home taking care of the household responsibilities. At the time 
of the divorce and presently the Respondent has health problems 
that cause her additional expenses. 
4. At the time of the divorce Petitioner and Respondent 
owned a 50% interest in a company known as Kapen Enterprises, Inc., 
dba Tiger Tanks. The parties agreed that Petitioner should be 
awarded all of the stock the parties owned in the corporation in 
the Decree of Divorce. That business was acquired and developed 
during the marriage. While the Respondent cared for the children, 
the home and livestock the Petitioner was able to develop this oil 
field rental business which provides the Petitioner income of over 
$250,000.00 per year plus numerous benefits. 
5. Petitioner agreed to pay Respondent permanent alimony 
in the amount of $3,100.00 per month. That is her main source of 
income. She has limited income from investment of monies awarded 
her in the divorce. 
6. Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify on May 29, 2002. 
The Petition to Modify, which he fashioned in the alternative. The 
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Petition sought termination of the alimony award based on alleged 
cohabitation of the Respondent, or a reduction of the amount of 
alimony based on an alleged "financial reversal" that makes it 
"impossible for [Petitioner] to pay the court ordered amount of 
$3,100.00 per month for alimony."1 
7. Prior to the divorce, the Kappen Enterprises dba Tiger 
Tanks issued sizeable distributions to the shareholders. In 2000, 
for example, the distributions to the shareholders were in the 
amount of $269,600.00; for the year 2001 it was $661,600.00; and 
for the year 2002 through September it was $213,000.00. 
Respondent's one-half share of the distributions were $134,000 in 
2000, $330,800 for 2001 and $106,500 for the first nine months of 
2002. These distributions were in addition to a monthly salary of 
$4,000.00 per month, plus additional expenses that were being paid 
on behalf of the Petitioner. Petitioner concedes in his motion to 
withdraw his claim of a reduction in income that he continues to 
2Just weeks prior to the trial date and after discovery was 
completed the Petitioner filed a motion seeking to withdraw his 
claim that he had a substantial reduction in income. The 
Respondent is entitled to recover all attorney's fees she 
incurred on defending against that claim. Furthermore the 
Petitioner's income remains relevant information because of the 
Respondent's need for reimbursement of the attorney's fees and 
costs she has incurred in defending against this Petition. 
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receive income in at least the same amount that he received at the 
time of the divorce which was in excess of $200,000.00 per year.-
8. The stress of the divorce and now the stress of this 
litigation has compounded the health problems of the Respondent. 
She needs additional medical care but can not afford that care 
because of the litigation expenses. 
9. Respondent has not cohabitated with Dane Gerkin. She 
has on occasion stayed at his home and at the home of other friends 
when her health prevented her from being alone. She has left her 
vehicle there to avoid the continual harassment and stalking by the 
Petitioner and others that he has hired. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THERE MUST BE A PERMANENT SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP AND 
THE PARTIES MUST BE RESIDING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND 
WIFE BEFORE ALIMONY TERMINATES. 
Utah law and Utah Courts recognize a narrow and specific 
definition of cohabitation that justifies a termination of an award 
of permanent alimony. The cases begin with a general definition of 
"cohabitation" found in Black's Law Dictionary, which defines 
Petitioner certainly can afford to pay alimony of 
$37,200.00 per year with an income of $200,000.00 to $500,000.00 
per year. 
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cohabitation as follows: "[t]o live together as husband and wife." 
The statute addressing when alimony is to be terminated in the 
event of cohabitation provides as follows: 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the 
party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9). 
The statute makes it clear that the burden on all elements 
is on the Petitioner in this case. 
A. The Parties Must ''Reside" Together: 
In defining what constitutes "residing" for the purposes of 
the statute, the Courts have held that there must be a showing that 
the parties are residing together in a situation that is more than 
a temporary stay. The Courts note that "common residency means the 
sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their 
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of 
time." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). "Cohabitation 
is not a sojourn, nor a habit of visiting, nor even remaining with 
for a time; the term implies continuity." Id. 
In Haddow, the Court considered a number of factors alleged 
to show that the Petitioner, who spent a lot of time with a man, 
was cohabitating. The Court found that there was no cohabitation. 
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The facts in Haddow established that spending significant time 
together, even at one person's residence, does constitute 
cohabitation. In Haddow the Court found that the following 
evidence was not sufficient to show they were residing/cohabitating 
together: 1) The woman spent most of her free time with a man; 2) 
had dinner with the man five or six times a weeks at her house and 
he usually stayed at her house until between 10:30 p.m. and 
midnight five or six nights a week, and that the man would often 
return for breakfast in the morning; 3) that she and the man 
usually spent the night together one night a week; 4) that the man 
had clothes at her house and that sometimes she took his clothes to 
the dry cleaner; 5) that the man occasionally changed and showered 
at her house; and 6) that the man received some mail at her house, 
and also at other places. In spite of the number of interactions 
with the parties, and the amount of time that they stayed together, 
that was not evidence that the parties resided/cohabitated. 
In Pendleton v Pendleton 918 P.2d 159 (Utah App. 1996) 
relying on Haddow the Court said that two key factors to establish 
are whether the cohabitating party had a key to the other persons 
home and was free to come and go from that home even when the other 
party was not present. Other factors included the sharing of 
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living expenses and having ones personal items and possession at 
the other parties home. 
In this case none of these factors exist. Petitioner's 
entire case is based on testimony that for a two month period the 
Respondent's vehicle was often at the Dane Gerkin's house and that 
on occasion Dane Gerkin would be driving the Respondent's vehicle 
or they would be seen at a store together. There is no evidence on 
the key factors in the case nor evidence of a permanent sexual 
relationship. The evidence will show that the Respondent did not 
have a key to Dane Gerkins home, that she did not freely come and 
go and that there was no permanent sexual relationship. Rather the 
evidence will show that Mr. Gerkin assisted the Respondent when she 
was ill, that they dated on occasion, that he assisted her to 
appointments when she did not have a driver's license, that the 
vehicle was often left at his house to elude those stalking her, 
and that the Respondent has her own home where she maintains her 
own utilities and possessions. 
B. There Must be a Permanent Sexual Relationship: 
In addition to residing together, to establish cohabitation, 
the party seeking to terminate alimony must show that the parties 
are participating in a relatively permanent sexual relationship 
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akin to that generally existing between husband and wife.J Haddow 
at 672, Siqg v Sigg 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah App. 1995). In the 
Haddow case, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence of 
a "permanent sexual relationship.'7 The evidence of the sexual 
relationship included the parties sleeping together approximately 
one night per week, vacations in Hawaii and Nevada where they had 
sexual relations, and exclusive dating for a period of fourteen 
months. Although this type sexual contact was sufficient to 
establish a "permanent sexual relationship", the case does not 
establish how much sexual contact there must be to qualify as a 
"permanent sexual relationship." However, the implication from 
Haddow is that where the sexual relations are few and far between, 
then there is no "permanent sexual relationship" established. 
There is no evidence in this case showing a permanent sexual 
relationship. 
Petitionerfs Trial Brief argues that Karen Sursa has the 
burden to show that any relationship she has is without sexual 
contact. Petitioner fails to inform the court that that was a 
prior version of the statute that put that burden on the 
recepient of the alimony. The statute has changed and is cited 
correctly in this memorandum. The present statute puts the 
burden on the Petitioner to establish all elements of 
cohabitation. 
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ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The Respondent is entitled to be awarded her legal fees on 
two basis. The Petitioner has abandon his claim of a change of 
circumstances and the facts show there was no basis for that claim. 
It was without merit and the Respondent should be awarded the fees 
incurred in defending against that claim. The facts will further 
show the claim of cohabitation is also without merit and only 
pursued as part of the continued harassment by the Petitioner. 
Respondent is also entitled to reimbursement of fees based 
on need. She has medical needs including surgery she can not 
afford because of the legal fees incurred. Petitioner certainly 
has the ability to pay those fees from his half million dollar 
income and should be ordered to reimburse the fees he has caused to 
be incurred. Wilde v Wilde 2001 UT APP 18, 35 P.2d 314. 
It is respectfully requested that the court deny the 
Petition and that the Respondent be awarded the attorney's fees and 
costs she has incurred. 
DATED this / day of September, 2003. 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, 
McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
i 
By: - v. , ', • • " ^ -' 
Clark B Allred 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Tara Duncan, legal assistant of McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN 
& TROTTER, P.C., certifies that she served the attached TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM upon counsel by placing a true and correct copy thereon 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Lance Dean 
134 West Main Street, Suite 202 
Vernal, Ut 84078 
and deposited the same, sealed, with the first class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah on 
the >r/> day of September, 2003. 
Tara Duncan 
ADDENDUM 10 
10. Section 30-1-4.5(1) Utah Code (2003) 
"(1) A mamage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal 
and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a 
contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a unifonn and general 
reputation as husband and wife. 
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ADUtSSDVM 11 
j 1. Section 30-3-3(1) Utah Code (2003) 
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish 
an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a 
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to 
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
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ADDENDUM 13 
13. Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without 
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a 
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the 
evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for 
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for 
lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
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ADDENDUM 14 
Rule 52(a). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2003). 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisoiy 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58 A; in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests 
for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion 
or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided 
in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, 
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
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